Several systems of semantics have been proposed for structured argumentation with priorities. As the proposed semantics often sanction contradictory conclusions (even for skeptical reasoners), there is a fundamental need for guidelines for understanding and evaluating them, especially their conceptual foundation and relationship. In this paper, we present an axiomatic analysis of the semantics of structured defeasible argumentation both with and without preferences by introducing a class of ordinary attack relations satisfying a set of simple and intuitive properties. We show that there exists a "normal form" for ordinary attack relations in the sense that stable extensions wrt any ordinary attack relation are stable extensions wrt the normal attack relations. We relate the ordinary semantics to other approaches, especially to the ASPIC+ framework and the prioritized approaches in logic programming.
that are arguably the most prominent attack relations proposed until now in the ASPIC+ framework. One of these four attack relations, the one based on the weakest link and elitist ordering leads to semantics with respect to which the dean does not teach while the other three as well as the non-argument-based approach of Brewka and Eiter [10] lead to conclusion that the dean does teach. P As the proposed approaches to defeasible reasoning with priorities [35, 34, 8, 15, 44, 40, 10, 26, 24, 43] often sanction contradictory conclusions (even for skeptical reasoners) there is a fundamental need for guidelines for understanding and evaluating them, especially their conceptual foundation and relationship when a user applies prioritized defeasible reasoning in reality.
A key property for evaluating the semantics of structured argumentation is the attack monotonicity. For a quick illustration of this property imagine you have a lively dancing bird in your garden and you know that it is a penguin. 3, 4 Suppose some neighbour tells you that the bird is most likely a penguin. 5 Will it change anything in your beliefs about your bird? Of course not. This is an example of the property of irrelevance of redundant defaults stating that adding redundant defaults into your knowledge base does not change your beliefs. This simple and natural property follows from the property of attack monotonicity. Proposed semantics in literature behave differently wrt these properties.
Example 1.2 (A Sherlock Holmes investigation).
Sherlock Holmes is investigating a case involving three persons P 1 , P 2 and S together with the dead body of a big man. The case could be represented by the following knowledge base.
1. The knowledge that one of the persons is the murderer is represented by three strict rules: 2. S is a small child who cannot kill a big man. This fact is captured in the base of evidence BE = {Inno(S)}.
3. The legal principle that people are considered innocent until proven otherwise could be represented in two ways:
• By three defeasible rules
• By two defeasible rules
as S is innocent, and hence the defeasible rule d :⇒ Inno(S) is intuitively redundant.
4. After digging around, it becomes clear to Holmes that P 1 has a strong motive to kill the victim while there is nothing connecting P 2 to the dead man. He hence will focus his investigation on P 1 . This knowledge is represented by a preference
stating that Holmes gives higher priority (in his investigation) to the scenario in which P 2 is innocent than to the other one.
Let KB 1 be the knowledge base containing the strict rules r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , the three defaults d 1 , d 2 , d and the fact that S is innocent together with the preference
Further let KB 0 be the knowledge base obtained from KB 1 
by removing defeasible rule d :⇒ Inno(S).
Due to the fact that S is innocent, we expect that default d will have no impact on the belief sets of the knowledge base KB 1 . In other words, both KB 1 and KB 0 are expected to have identical belief sets, concluding ¬Inno(P 1 ), Inno(P 2 ) Surprisingly, KB 0 , KB 1 have different belief sets wrt the semantics based on attack relations employing the democratic order proposed and studied by Modgil and Prakken in [34] as elaborated below.
For ease of reference, we refer to the attack relations proposed and studied by Modgil and Prakken in [34] as MP-attack relations in the rest of this example. 3 In other words, it is an undisputed fact to you that the bird is a penguin. According to Definition 3.3, BE = {penguin}. 4 Remember Mumble, the main penguin character in the animated movie Happy Feet? 5 In other words, you add a defeasible rule ⇒ penguin to your knowledge base. 6 Inno stands for Innocent. • Relevant arguments concerning the innocence of P 1 , P 2 wrt KB 0 are given in Fig. 1 . Due to the preference of d 2 over d 1 , N 2 attacks A 1 but N 1 does not attack A 2 wrt all four MP-attack relations in the ASPIC+ framework. Therefore N 2 also attacks N 1 . The unique stable extension for KB 0 thus contains A 2 , N 2 . Hence ¬Inno(P 1 ), Inno(P 2 ) are skeptically justified (as expected) for KB 0
• There are two new relevant arguments concerning the innocence of P 1 , P 2 wrt KB 1 (illustrated in Fig. 2 ). According to the MP-attack relations based on the democratic order, N 1 attacks A 2 . Hence N 1 also attacks N 2 , N 2 . Therefore there is a new stable extension containing A 1 , N 1 , N 1 justifying:
Inno(P 1 ), ¬Inno(P 2 ), a counter-intuitive set of beliefs A closer look reveals that MP-semantics based on democratic order behave counter-intuitively because they violate the principle of attack monotonicity as follows: N 1 could be obtained from N 1 by replacing the defeasible evidence ⇒ Inno(S) by the hard evidence Inno (S) . Hence N 1 should be "stronger" than N 1 . Therefore if N 1 attacks A 2 , we expect N 1 to also attack A 2 , which is not the case according to the MP-attack relations based on the democratic order in [34] .
MP-semantics based on the elitist ordering as well as the approaches of Brewka and Eiter [10] and Delgrande, Schaub, Tompits, Wang [15, 44] all provide the expected conclusion in this case. P Brewka, Niemelä and Truszczynski [11] have persuasively argued that the intuition of defeasible reasoning is about finding (justified) belief sets that give the most accurate picture of reality assuming the world is as normal as possible (see also Reiter, Reiter and Criscuolo [41, 42] and Delgrande [14] ). Stable belief sets could be viewed as providing such pictures of the reality where the beliefs are supported and defended by arguments that are grounded in the undisputed facts about the reality and based on the world's "normal patterns" represented by defeasible rules. The assumption that the world is "as normal as possible" is realized by taking into account all possible arguments that could be built based on the given facts and normal patterns of the world. The grounding of considered arguments in the undisputed facts ensures that the accepted beliefs are grounded in the reality. Therefore the more facts we have about the real world, the more pro and con arguments we have about the world and hence the more accurate pictures we have about the reality.
Suppose all beliefs in a stable belief set S of a knowledge base K indeed represent facts about the real world. Therefore the updated knowledge base K = K + obtained by adding the facts in a subset ⊆ S to K, contains more facts about the real world and hence should provide a more accurate picture of the reality. Since S is an accurate picture of the reality and K should provide a more accurate picture of the reality then K , it should be intuitive and sensible to expect that S is also a belief set of the updated knowledge base K . We refer to the property stating that expanding the base of undisputed facts and observation of a knowledge base K by new facts that belong to a stable belief set S of K results in an updated knowledge base of which S is still a stable belief set as the property of credulous cumulativity. The following Example 1.3 shows that credulous cumulativity helps shed useful insights into the different semantics of structured argumentation. Example 1.3. Consider the knowledge base K in Example 1.1 where it is known that Dean holds.
Rule preferences have been studied extensively in logic programming [8, 10, 15] , which is arguably the conceptually closest framework to structured argumentation. As the intuition underlining the credulous cumulativity property is conceptually not specifically bound to argument-based approaches, it is natural to ask whether this property is also satisfied by the semantics of logic programming with and without rule preferences. In sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 we show that credulous cumulativity is indeed embraced, although implicitly, by the two most well-known and well-studied approaches to preference handling in logic programming: the approach advocated by Delgrande, Schaub, Tompits, Wang and others [15, 44] where preferences are viewed as a prescription of the application order of rules and the Brewka and Eiter approach [10] , which is based on two principles referred to as BE-principles that preference semantics should follow. We study the relation between structured argumentation and logic programming with rule preferences in two different directions: In sections 7.1, 7.2, we demonstrate that the conceptual ideas and principles underlining the logic programming approaches could be naturally incorporated into our technical framework of structured argumentation. In the other direction, we show directly within the technical contexts of logic programming with rule preferences (section 7.3) that the credulous cumulativity property is satisfied.
There are distinct approaches to study the semantics of rule preferences. Some are based on specificity while others could be based on social values, laws or just common customs [6, 18, 15, 11, 10] . Though the underlining intuitions for the introduction of rule preferences could be different, they all share a basic and natural interpretation of the preference of a defeasible rule d over another rule d , that in a situation when each of rules d, d is applicable (i.e. the premises of both rules follow from the factual evidence and the strict rules in the knowledge base), but both could not be applied together, then d should be applied. We adopt this basic and natural view of rule preference and capture it by the property of effective rebuts stating simply that a defeasible argument containing exactly one rule attacks another defeasible single-rule argument only if the rule of the former is not less preferred than the one of the latter.
A key contribution of this paper is the introduction and study of a set of properties for analyzing and evaluating the semantics of structured argumentation. The properties could be divided into three groups. The first group consists of the properties of credulous cumulativity and attack monotonicity together with the property of context-independence. The second one consists of two pretty simple properties: one is the property of subargument structure stating that any attack against a subargument is also an attack against the entire argument, and the other is the property of attack closure stating intuitively that attacks are either based on undercuts (and hence preference-independent) or based on contradicting arguments (and hence preference-dependent if the preference relation is not empty). These two groups of axioms together determine the semantics of knowledge bases without preferences between rules. The semantics of rule preferences are dealt with by two new properties. One is the property of effective rebuts and the other is the link-oriented property expressing the intuition that attacks are directed towards identifying "culprit link" within arguments.
There is some tension between the properties of credulous cumulativity and attack monotonicity. When some beliefs justified by some arguments in a stable extension are confirmed in the reality and hence put into the base of evidence, many arguments may get stronger due to the attack monotonicity property.
If the arguments belonging to the stable extension get stronger, they will strengthen the defense of the stable extension and hence there is no counter-effect on the credulous cumulativity property. But if an argument not belonging to the stable extension gets stronger, its attacking power also grows. The question is whether such stronger arguments could threaten the stability of the stable extension. The answer is "no" if the attack relation assignment satisfies the link-oriented property stating intuitively that attacks are directed against "culprit links" within arguments.
If the link-oriented property is not satisfied then the growing power of the strengthened arguments could destroy the credulous cumulativity property. For an illustration, consider the arguments (see Figs. 3, 4) 7 We refer to the attack relations and associated semantics studied by Modgil and Prakken in [34] wrt the ASPIC+ framework as MP-attack relations. 8 D, P, T, A stand for Dean, Professor, Teach and Administrator respectively. 9 Hence the attack is directed against some link in A 2 . 10 Hence the link in A 1 is not the "culprit" causing the attack from A 3 against A 2 implying that the "culprit link" is in A 2 . It turns out that wrt the MP-weakest link principle and the elitist ordering, A 3 attacks A 2 but A 3 attacks neither A 1 nor A 2 . Therefore the link-oriented property is violated. Not surprisingly, the credulous cumulativity is violated as we have discussed in Example 1.3.
The presented properties in this paper could be viewed as an axiom system for evaluating, understanding and comparing existing approaches to structured argumentation systems with preferences. They could also serve as guidelines when defining new argumentation systems. The stable semantics of argument systems obeying such axioms is characterized by a normal form such that the stable extensions of any argument system obeying the axiom system are also stable extensions wrt the normal form which is itself also obeying the axioms.
Another important contribution of this paper is the application of the presented axiom system to analyze and evaluate prominent approaches to defeasible reasoning with preferences. We especially analyze and evaluate the four prominent attack relations proposed by Modgil and Prakken for the ASPIC+ framework. As illustrated in Example 1.2, the two attack relations based on democratic ordering do not satisfy the attack monotonicity which could lead to counter-intuitive conclusions. We will show later in section 7.4 that the other ones based on the elitist ordering do not satisfy consistency postulate (and hence the credulous cumulativity property). These insights suggest that a revision of prominent MP-attack relations together with much more research may be needed to understand the semantics of ASPIC+. The axiom system studied in this paper could play a significant role here.
The paper also makes a relevant contribution in the exploration of the relations between argument-based and nonargument-based approaches to defeasible reasoning with priorities by showing that the semantics proposed by Delgrande, Schaub and Tompits [15] and Brewka and Eiter [10] , arguably the most prominent ones in logic programming with priorities, satisfy the credulous cumulativity property. To our knowledge, this is the first time a deep insight between these two prominent approaches to reasoning with priorities has been gained. This insight is even more relevant from the point of view of a user who is interested in the application of defeasible reasoning with priorities in reality as logic programming offers arguably one of the most sophisticated industrial-strength development environments for reasoning systems. Such a user may be well-advised to use logic programming as her/his development base (saving very valuable resources for the implementation of new systems for reasoning with preferences) if she/he knows that there is a significant convergence between the argument-based and non-argument-based approaches. Of course more work needs to be done to reach this stage of knowledge and we believe that this paper provides a significant first step for further research in this direction.
The paper is organized as follows. We recall quickly the basic notions of abstract argumentation in section 2. In the following section, key notions of knowledge bases, rule preferences, arguments and sensible classes of knowledge bases are recalled from the literature or introduced. In section 4, we introduce a novel notion of attack relation assignments together with the basic properties for knowledge bases with or without rule preferences. We then introduce in section 5 a basic attack relation assignment and show that it represents a "normal form" of attack relation assignments satisfying the basic properties and that each stable extension wrt any attack relation assignments satisfying the basic properties is also a stable extension wrt the basic attack relation assignment. In section 6, we introduce two new properties for dealing with rule preferences. We define a class of ordinary attack relation assignments as those satisfying the basic properties together with the new properties for handling rule preferences. We then introduce a normal attack relation assignment and show that it represents a "normal-form" of ordinary attack relation assignments in the sense that it is itself an ordinary attack relation assignment and each stable extension wrt any ordinary attack relation assignments is also a stable extension wrt the normal attack relation assignment. We study in section 7 the relationship between our approach and related approaches in the literature. We first show that the semantics, based on the operational reading of the preference relation between rules as a specification of their application order [15] , could be captured in our framework. We then show that the principles underlining Brewka and Eiter's semantics of prioritized logic programming [10] are also satisfied by the ordinary semantics in our framework. We also show that extended logic programming with and without preferences satisfies the property of credulous cumulativity. We end this section by an in depth study of the attack relations of Modgil and Prakken [34] . We discuss possible future works and conclude in section 8.
This paper is both a follow-up and an extension of our paper in [17] . It is an extension as it provides an expanded presentation and proofs of the properties presented in [17] . It is a follow-up as it offers significant new results, especially new properties of attack closure and link-orientation and new theorems showing that the normal attack relation assignment represents indeed a normal form of ordinary attack relation assignments and the credulous cumulativity also holds for complete extension semantics. We also provide an extensive study of related literature.
Preliminaries
An abstract argumentation framework [16] is defined simply as a pair (AR, att) where AR is a set of arguments and att ⊆ AR × AR. (A, B) ∈ att means that A attacks B. A set of argument S attacks (or is attacked by) an argument A (or a set of arguments R) if some argument in S attacks (or is attacked by) A (or some argument in R); S is conflict-free if it does not attack itself. S is conflicting if S is not conflict-free. A set of arguments S defends an argument A if S attacks each attack against A. S is admissible if S is conflict-free and defends each argument in it. The semantics of abstract argumentation is defined by various notions of extensions. A complete extension is an admissible set of arguments containing each argument it defends. A stable extension is a conflict-free set of arguments that attacks every argument not belonging to it. It is well-known that stable extensions are complete but not vice versa.
Defeasible knowledge bases
We assume a non-empty set L of ground atoms and their classical negations. An atom is also called a positive literal while a negative literal is the negation of a positive literal. A set of literals is said to be contradictory if it contains a pair a, ¬a of an atom a and its negation ¬a. head) of r, denoted by bd(r) (resp. hd(r)).
2. For a set of rules R, denote hd(R) = {hd(r) | r ∈ R}. P Definition 3.2. A rule-based system is defined as a triple
where following conditions are satisfied:
1. RS is a set of strict rules. 13 We thank an anonymous referee of our ECAI 2014 paper [17] for suggesting the elegant notation ab d . Knowledge bases whose preference relations are preorders 15 are studied extensively within the ASPIC+ framework [34, 35] while basic knowledge bases are studied in [12] .
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Remark 3.1. For convenience, we often write
We recall below the key notion of arguments from [46, 12, 34, 35] . 
Definition 3.4 (Arguments
is an argument with conclusion α and last rule r denoted by cnl(A) and last(A) respectively.
3. Each argument wrt K is obtained by applying the above steps 1, 2 finitely many times. P
For an illustration, consider the arguments in Example 1.3 where
In Example 1.2, the formal representation of A 1 , N 1 are as follows:
Notation 3.2.
1. The set of all arguments wrt a knowledge base K is denoted by AR K . The set of the conclusions of arguments in a set S ⊆ AR K is denoted by cnl(S).
2.
A strict argument is an argument containing no defeasible rule. An argument is defeasible iff it is not strict. 
18
X is said to be closed iff X = CN RS (X). X is said to be inconsistent iff its closure CN RS (X) is contradictory. 19 X is consistent iff it is not inconsistent. P
14 Also called preference-free in [17] . 15 A preorder is a reflexive and transitive relation [13] . 16 Note that preorders are reflexive, i.e. they always contain d d for any d ∈ RD. Therefore if RD is not empty, the preorder is not empty. It follows that the preference relations of basic knowledge bases with non-empty set of defeasible rules are not preorders. Notation 3.3. We often write CN( X) or CN K (X) for CN RS (X) if there are no possibilities for misunderstanding. We also often write X l (or 
4. K is said to satisfy the self-contradiction property iff for each minimal inconsistent set of domain literals X ⊆ L, for each x ∈ X , it holds: X K ¬x. P
The properties of closure under transposition or contraposition are introduced in [12, 39, 34] while the self-contradiction property together with the following lemma can be found in [19] . 1. The basic defeasible subarguments of an argument A that are not proper subarguments of other basic defeasible subarguments of A play a prominent role in our later exposition and are referred to as maximal basic defeasible subarguments of A and formally defined by:
and r is strict 20 I.e. the set CN RS (BE) is not contradictory.
2. For an argument A, the set of defeasible rules appearing last in A is defined by:
Maximal basic defeasible sub-arguments are special cases of the maximal fallible sub-arguments in [34] . While the later are defined for any ASPIC+ knowledge bases, the formers are defined only for the knowledge bases considered in this paper.
Basic properties of attack relation assignments
We introduce in this section the basic properties of attack relation assignments. The semantics of structured defeasible argumentation systems are determined by appropriate attack relations where strict arguments are not attacked by any other arguments as they are considered reflecting the reality and hence beyond any doubt. • From now on, whenever we refer to a knowledge base K without any specific information, we mean one of the form K = (RBS, BE) with RBS = (RS, RD, ).
• For any finite set of domain literals, define K + = (RBS, BE ∪ ). P
Definition 4.2 (Belief sets).
A set S ⊆ L is said to be a stable (resp. complete) belief set of knowledge base K wrt an attack relation assignment att iff att(K ) is defined and there is a stable (resp complete) extension E of (AR K , att(K )) such that S = cnl(E). P
Credulous cumulativity
We begin with the introduction of the formal definition of the credulous cumulativity property.
Definition 4.3 (Credulous cumulativity).
Let K be a sensible class of knowledge bases and att be an attack relation assignment defined for K. We say att satisfies the property of credulous cumulativity for K if and only if for each K ∈ K, for each stable belief set S of K wrt att and for each finite subset ⊆ S of domain literals, 1. K + is a consistent knowledge base (i.e. K + belongs to K), and 2. S is a stable belief set of K + wrt att. P For an illustration, consider the knowledge base K in Example 1.3. It is obvious that K = K + {P } is consistent and hence belongs to any sensible class of knowledge bases to which K belongs. Let att be an attack relation assignment where 21 It is easy to see that S = {D, A, P , T } is a stable belief set of K wrt att(K ). It is also straightforward to see that S is a stable belief set of K wrt att(K ).
There are different versions of the property of credulous cumulativity according to different types of belief sets. In this paper, we focus on stable semantics to facilitate the comparison of argument-based and non-argument-based prioritized default reasoning. We discuss the credulous cumulativity property wrt complete extension semantics in section 8. 
Attack monotonicity
We proceed further with the introduction of the property of attack monotonicity stating that when some piece of defeasible information on which an argument is based is confirmed by unchallenged observations, the argument is strengthened in the sense that whatever is attacked by the original argument should also be attacked by the strengthened one, and whatever attacks the strengthened one, attacks the original one. In other words, the more hard evidence your arguments are based on, the stronger your arguments become.
Let A ∈ AR K and ⊆ BE be a finite set of literals. The strengthening of A wrt denoted by A ↑ , is the set of arguments obtained by replacing zero, one or more subarguments of A by their conclusions provided that these conclusions belong to . 
Definition 4.4 (Strengthening operation
Consider the arguments A, A , X , X in Fig. 5 and = {a}. It is clear that A , X are subarguments of A, X respectively and X ∈ A ↑ {a} and X ∈ A ↑ {a}.
Definition 4.5 (Attack monotonicity).
Let att be an attack relation assignment defined for a sensible class K of knowledge bases. We say att satisfies the property of attack monotonicity for K iff for each knowledge base K ∈ K, for each finite subset ⊆ BE, for all A, B ∈ AR K and for each X ∈ A ↑ , the following assertions hold: As we have discussed in the introduction, a natural property of knowledge bases inherently related to the property of attack monotonicity is the property of irrelevance of redundant defeasible rules. We introduce below the formal definition of this property and a theorem showing that it follows from the property of attack monotonicity. 
where K = (RS, RD, , BE). P For ease of reference, for any evidence ω ∈ BE, we denote the default "⇒ ω" by d ω . We say the attack relation assignment att satisfies the property of irrelevance of redundant defaults for K iff for each knowledge base K = (RSB, BE) ∈ K, for each evidence ω ∈ BE:
1. the stable belief sets of K and K + d ω coincide, and 2. the complete belief sets of
The property of irrelevance of redundant defaults follows from the attack monotonicity property if the attack relations satisfy a general and natural condition of context-independence.
Definition 4.7 (Context-independence).
Let att be an attack relation assignment defined for a sensible class K of knowledge bases. We say att satisfies the property of context-independence for K iff for any two arbitrary knowledge bases K , K with preference relations , respectively and for any two arguments A, B belonging to AR K ∩ AR K such that the restrictions of and Proof. See Appendix C. P Example 1.2 could be viewed as an illustration of Theorem 4.1 (in a contrapositive way).
Further properties on attack structure
We introduce in this section two simple and natural properties on the structure of attack relations. We begin with the property of sub-argument structure.
Definition 4.8 (Subargument structure).
Let K be a sensible class of knowledge bases and att be an attack relation assignment defined for K. Then att is said to satisfy the property of subargument structure for K iff for each knowledge base K ∈ K, for all A, B ∈ AR K , it holds that
A key consequence of the property of subargument structure is the property of subargument closure. Proof. Let E be a complete extension of (AR K , att(K )). Further let A ∈ E and X be a subargument of A. If X is strict then there is no attack against X. Hence X ∈ E.
Suppose X is defeasible. From the sub-argument structure axiom, each attack against X is an attack against A. Hence each attack against X is counter-attacked by E. Therefore X ∈ E. P Lemma 4.3 is not new. Martinez, Garcia and Simari [33] include it as a key component in their study of abstract argumentation. Within the ASPIC+ framework, it is known as Theorem 12 [34] . It is proposed as a postulate in Amgoud [1] .
One way for arguments to attack each other is by undercutting [38, 12, 34, 35] recalled below. Within our framework, if two arguments do not undercut or contradict each other then they do not have any reason to attack each other. We capture this intuition by the property of attack closure introduced below.
Definition 4.10 (Attack closure).
Let K be a sensible class of knowledge bases and att be an attack relation assignment for K.
The attack relation assignment att is said to satisfy the property of attack closure for K iff for each knowledge base K ∈ K, for all A, B ∈ AR K , the following conditions hold:
1. If A attacks B wrt att(K ) then A undercuts B or A contradicts B.
If A undercuts B then A attacks B wrt att(K ). P
The scope of attack closure should be expanded when new types of attacks need to be considered. ASPIC+ [34] allows other types of attacks, like contrary-rebut or contrary-undermine attacks. These attacks like undercuts are preferenceindependent in the sense that they are not affected by the preferences between rules or arguments. As we focus in this paper on understanding the semantics of preferences between rules and hence allow undercuts as the only type of preference-independent attacks, our version of attack closure reflects this focus. 
Notation 4.4 (Basic properties).
The properties of credulous cumulativity, attack monotonicity, context-independence, subargument structure and attack closure are often referred to as basic properties. P
An axiomatic semantics for basic knowledge bases
We start our exposition with recalling a notion of rebut, a special case of contradicting, from [12, 34, 38] . Pollock [38] views A as a rebut to B if A contradicts B (at B) and B is defeasible. Caminada and Amgoud [12] introduce a restricted version of rebut where B is required to be basic defeasible. Modgil and Prakken [34] view restricted rebut as an attack in their system though they referred to it simply as rebut. We follow Modgil and Prakken in Definition 5.1.
The following lemma suggests that stable semantics wrt the attack relation assignments satisfying the basic axioms could be captured by those based solely on the notions of rebut and undercut even though the attack closure property states only that attacks should be based on the notions of undercut and contradiction. 
Lemma 5.1 (Characteristic lemma). Let K be a sensible class of basic knowledge bases and att be an attack relation assignment satisfying all basic properties for K. Further let K ∈ K and E be a stable extension of (AR
K , att(K )), B ∈ AR K \ E and A ∈ E such that (A, B) ∈ att(K ).
Definition 5.2 (Basic attack relation assignment).
Let B be the sensible class of all consistent basic knowledge bases. An attack relation assignment defined for B is said to be basic and denoted by att bs iff it assigns to each basic knowledge base K ∈ B, an attack relation
We proceed to show that the basic attack relation assignment att bs is indeed a normal form among the attack relation assignments satisfying the basic properties in the following sense:
• Stable extensions wrt any attack relation assignment satisfying the basic properties are also stable extensions wrt the basic attack relation assignment.
• The basic attack relation assignment att bs satisfies all basic properties.
The following theorem confirms the first of the above two assertions. Proof. Let E be a stable extension of (AR K , att(K )). Because att satisfies the credulous cumulativity property, cnl(E) is consistent (Lemma 4.1) . Since E is conflict-free wrt att(K) and att satisfies the property of attack closure, E is free of undercut-attacks. 24 We show that E is conflict-free wrt att bs (K ). Suppose E is not conflict-free wrt att bs (K ). Therefore there is A, B ∈ E s.t. (A, B) ∈ att bs (K ), i.e. A either undercuts or rebuts B. Since E is free from undercut-attacks, it follows A rebuts B (at B ). Therefore cnl( A) = ¬cnl(B ). From Lemma 4 
.3, B ∈ E. Therefore cnl(E) is contradictory. This is impossible since cnl(E) is consistent. Hence E is conflict-free wrt att bs (K ).
We show that E attacks every argument not belonging to it (wrt att bs (K )). Let If A undercuts B, it is clear that X also undercuts B. If A rebuts B (at B ) then it is also clear that X also rebuts B (at B ).
Hence X attacks B wrt att bs (K ).
Suppose C attacks X wrt att bs (K ), i.e. C undercut X or C rebut X (at X ) for X ∈ A ↑ . If C undercuts X, it is clear that C also undercuts A. Suppose C rebuts X (at X ). From Lemma 4.2, there is a subargument A of A such that X ∈ A ↑ . Hence last( A ) = last( X ) and A is basic defeasible. Hence C rebuts A (at A ). Therefore C attacks A wrt att bs (K ). P property even though rebut is not explicitly specified in it. 25 An attentive reader may wonder whether the reverse of Theorem 5.1 holds. We give two examples and a lemma below to show that it does not hold in general.
• RS consists of four strict rules:
• RD consists of two defeasible rules:
Let K be a sensible class of basic knowledge bases defined by: Fig. 6 . Let att be an attack relation assignment defined for K as follows: 26 it is clear that att does not satisfy the property of subargument structure. 25 We will see in section 7.4 (Lemma 7.5) that all MP-attack relation assignments proposed in [34] coincide with the basic attack relations for the basic knowledge bases. Let att be an attack relation assignment defined for K as follows: Proof. See Appendix M. P
Axiomatic semantics for prioritized knowledge bases
There are many interpretations of the preference of one default to another. Some are due to specificity or social values while others could just be a specification of the operational order in applying the defaults [18, 6, 8, 15, 10] . Though the underlying intuitions for the introduction of rule preferences could be different, they all share a basic and natural interpretation of the preference of a defeasible rule over another rule that in a situation when each of them is applicable (i.e. the premises of both rules follow from the factual evidences and the strict rules in the knowledge base), but both could not be applied together, then the preferred one should be applied.
Example 6.1. Suppose K consists of just two defeasible rules: Fig. 7 ) rebut each other.
As d 2 is preferred to d 1 , A 2 is considered an effective rebut against A 1 while A 1 is an ineffective rebut against A 2 . Hence A 2 is an attack against A 1 , but not vice versa. P
We adopt this basic and natural view of rule preference and capture it by the property of effective rebuts below. 
Definition 6.1 (Effective rebut).
Let K be a sensible class of knowledge bases and att be an attack relation assignment defined for K. We say that att satisfies the effective rebut property for K iff for each knowledge base K ∈ K, for all arguments 
It is now the time to present the last property in our axiom system, of which the intuition is that attacks are directed towards "identifying" some links as the culprits in an attacked argument.
We first introduce a "weakening" operation, a kind of a "reverse" version of the strengthening operation.
Let A ∈ AR K and AS ⊆ AR K . By A ↓ AS we denote the set of arguments obtained by replacing zero, one or more premises of A by arguments in AS whose conclusions coincide with the premises.
Definition 6.2 (Weakening operation).
• Let A ∈ AR K and AS ⊆ AR K . The weakening of A by AS, denoted by A ↓ AS is defined inductively as follows:
• B ∈ AR K is said to be a weakening of A by AS iff B ∈ A ↓ AS. P
For an illustration, consider again the arguments in Example 1.3. Applying Definition 6.2 yields directly that
Proof. By induction on the structure of A.
Base case:
The lemma holds obviously.
Inductive step. Let
Note that the reverse of the above Lemma 6.1 does not hold in general.
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Definition 6.3 (Link-orientation). Let K be a sensible class of knowledge bases and att be an attack relation assignment defined for K. We say that att satisfies the link-oriented property (or property of link-orientation) for K iff for each knowledge base K ∈ K, for all arguments A, B, C ∈ AR K such that C is a weakening of B by AS ⊆ AR K (i.e. C ∈ B ↓ AS), the following assertion holds:
If A attacks C wrt att(K) and A does not attack AS wrt att(K) then A attacks B wrt att(K). As elaborated in Example 1.3, with respect to the ASPIC+-attack relation based on the weakest link principle and the elitist ordering, A 3 attack A 2 but A 3 does not attack A 2 . Hence this attack relation assignment does not satisfy the linkoriented property.
Definition 6.4 (Ordinary attack relations
). An attack relation assignment att is said to be ordinary for a sensible class K of knowledge bases iff it satisfies the properties of credulous cumulativity, attack monotonicity, context-independence, subargument structure, attack closure, effective rebuts and link-orientation for K. P
A structural insight into ordinary attack relation assignments
Apart from undercut, stable extensions wrt ordinary attack relation assignments employ a special kind of rebut, referred to as normal-rebut, to attack arguments not belonging to it. Let us first illustrate the idea.
Let att be an ordinary attack relation assignment for a sensible class of knowledge bases K. Consider a knowledge base K = (RS, RD, , BE) in K such that the arguments A and B (in Fig. 8 ) belong to its set of arguments. Note that the bodies of
As A rebuts B, the question is under which condition the rebut is effective such that A is considered an attack against B.
Suppose A attacks B. What could we say about the preferences between defeasible rules in A and B? Let K = K + {a} and suppose K ∈ K. It is clear that A is an argument wrt K . From the attack monotonicity and context-independence of att, it follows that A attacks B. From the effective rebut property, it follows that d 2 ⊀ d 3 . 30 Similarly we could also conclude that
It turns out that the above discussed scenarios of preferences between defeasible rules in A, B are special cases of a general pattern of rebut, referred to as normal-rebut that are employed by stable extensions wrt ordinary attack relation assignments to attack arguments not belonging them. We give a formal definition of normal-rebut below followed by a lemma capturing this insight.
Definition 6.5 (Normal rebut).
Let K be a knowledge base and A, B ∈ AR K . We say that A normal-rebuts B (at X) iff A rebuts B (at X) and the following normal condition holds.
(Normal condition). There is no defeasible rule d ∈ ldr( A) such that d ≺ last( X). P
It is not difficult to see that if K is basic, normal-rebuts coincide with rebuts. The following Lemma 6 .2 generalizes the characteristic Lemma 5.1 for ordinary attack relation assignments.
Lemma 6.2 (General characteristic lemma). Let att be an ordinary attack relation assignment for a sensible class K of knowledge bases. Further let K ∈ K and E be a stable extension of (AR K , att(K )), A ∈ E and B ∈ AR K \ E such that A attacks B wrt att(K). Then A undercuts or normal-rebuts B.
Proof. As any ordinary attack relation assignment satisfies all basic properties, from Lemma 5.1, it follows immediately that A undercuts or rebuts B. The rest of the proof follows from Lemma E.1 in Appendix E. P Lemma 6 .2 shows that stable extensions wrt ordinary attack relations employ normal-rebuts or undercuts to attack arguments not belonging to it. This insight suggests that an attack relation based on undercuts and normal-rebuts could be ordinary. We show below that it is indeed the case. 29 It is obvious that the normal attack relation assignment generalizes the basic attack relation assignment of basic knowledge bases.
Lemma 6.3. For any consistent basic knowledge base K, att nr (K ) = att bs (K ). P
We proceed to show that the normal attack relation assignment att nr represents a normal form among the ordinary attack relation assignments in the following sense:
• The normal attack relation assignment att nr is ordinary.
• Stable extensions wrt any ordinary attack relation assignment are also stable extensions wrt the normal attack relation assignment.
Normal attack relation assignment is ordinary
We start with three relevant lemmas. Proof. The properties of context-independence, subargument structure, attack closure, effective rebuts and link-orientation follow immediately from Lemma 6.4 . The property of attack monotonicity follows from Lemma 6.5. The property of credulous cumulativity is proved in Lemma 6.6. P
Normal form of ordinary semantics
Our next result is that the normal attack relation assignment represents a normal form of ordinary semantics in the sense that the stable extensions wrt any ordinary attack relation assignment are also stable wrt the normal attack relation assignment. Proof. Let E be a stable extension of (AR K , att(K )).
Because att satisfies the credulous cumulativity property, cnl(E) is consistent (Lemma 4.1) . Since E is conflict-free wrt att(K) and att satisfies the property of attack closure, E is free of undercut-attacks. 31 We show that E is conflict-free wrt att nr (K ). Suppose E is not conflict-free wrt att nr (K ). Therefore there is A, B ∈ E s.t. (A, B) ∈ att nr (K ). Since E is free from undercutattacks, it follows A rebuts B at a basic defeasible subargument B of B. Therefore cnl( A) = ¬cnl(B ). From 
Relations to other approaches

Operational interpretation of rule ordering
Preference orders between rules in prioritized default logics or logic programming are viewed in [15, 44] as specifying application orders of rules. We show in this section that this operational reading of preferences is sound wrt normal semantics and also complete for the class of stratified knowledge bases.
The operational reading of preferences defines the semantics of a knowledge base K = (RS, RD, , BE) in two steps: first determining the stable extensions of the basic knowledge base K basic = (RS, RD, ∅, BE) underlying K and then applying the preference relation to pick the preferred extensions.
We first adapt the definitions in [15, 44] to structured argumentation below.
32 is said to be an enumeration-based extension of K iff there is an enumeration (d i ) i≥1 of E = {d ∈ RD | d appears in some argument of E} such that for all i, j, we have:
The intuitions of the first two conditions in Definition 7.1 should be clear. The third condition states that if a default d is not applied while a less preferred d i is, then this is either because some of the premises of d are not satisfied wrt the belief set generated by the extension or because d has been already rebutted or undercut before d i is applied.
The following theorem shows the soundness of the enumeration-based semantics wrt the normal semantics.
Theorem 7.1. Every enumeration-based extension of K is a stable extension of (AR K , att nr (K )).
Proof. See Appendix G. P
When the operational interpretation of rule preferences interferes with the basic control mechanism of "applying a rule when its premises are satisfied", there could be no enumeration-based extension. For example, consider a knowledge base
as the first two conditions in Definition 7.1 cannot be fulfilled.
When the basic control mechanism and the operational reading of the default preferences do not interfere, the enumeration-based semantics and the normal semantics coincide. We introduce below a class of stratified knowledge bases where the two mechanisms do not interfere by applying the concept of stratification in logic programming and Brewka's idea of ranking function [4, 8] to our framework.
Stratified knowledge bases
A preference relation is said to be ranked iff there is a ranking function ρ assigning non-negative integers to defeasible rules in RD such that for all
For an illustration, the preference relation in Example 1.3 could be ranked by ρ(
Notation 7.1. Abusing the notation for simplicity, for any argument A, we denote the maximum of the ranks of the defeasible rules appearing in A by ρ(A).
We introduce below the notion of stratified knowledge base that is inspired by both the concept of stratification in logic programming and Brewka's ranking function [4, 8] . 
(d). P
Interpreting the ranking of defaults as their application order, the first condition states the obvious that the last rule in a basic defeasible argument should be applied last while the meaning of the second one is that if a default is undercut then the undercut should happen before the default's turn to be applied.
For an illustration, the preference relation in Example 1.3 could be ranked by ρ( Proof. See Appendix G. P
Brewka and Eiter principles
Brewka and Eiter [10] have proposed two principles, referred to as BE-principles in this section, for the evaluation of semantics of prioritized default reasoning. We show in this section that both BE-principles are satisfied by the ordinary attack relation assignments.
The first BE principle concerns the intuition of preferences between defeasible rules while the second one is about relevance of rules. We start with the second one as it is the simpler of them.
The intuition of the second BE-principle is best illustrated by a simple example. Suppose the weather forecast for tomorrow is sunshine, light wind, no rain. You plan to go yachting. Suppose somebody tells you a rule that in stormy weather, yachting is forbidden. Of course knowing this rule will not affect your plan as the weather is fine and the rule is not applicable.
We say that a rule r is applicable wrt set of literals S if bd(r) ⊆ S. We adapt the second BE-principle from [10] In [10] , the first BE-principle is presented for extended logic programming. We adapt it to our framework below.
Let S be a set of literals. S is said to be generated by a set ⊆ RS ∪ RD iff the following conditions are satisfied 1. For each literal σ , σ ∈ S iff there is an argument A such that cnl( A) = σ and all rules appearing in A belong to .
For each strict rule
Note that the uniqueness of wrt S follows immediately from the second and third conditions. In general, these two conditions are not sufficient to guarantee the first one. To see this simple but relevant point, consider a knowledge base consisting of just a unique strict rule r : a → a. Then S = {a} and = {r} satisfy both the second and third condition but not the first.
, if exists, is often referred to as the generating set of S.
Definition 7.4 (First BE-principle).
We say that an attack relation assignment att satisfies the first BE-principle for a sensible class K of knowledge bases iff for each K ∈ K, the following condition is satisfied: Suppose S, S be consistent sets of literals generated respectively by sets of rules ∪ {d} and ∪ {d } such that d, d ∈ RD \ and d ≺ d . Then S is not a stable belief set of K wrt att. P Lemma 5.4 , it follows that the set of stable extensions wrt att and att bs coincide. Therefore these two attack relation assignments have identical stable belief sets. Since att bs satisfies both BE-principles for K, att also satisfies both BE-principles. But att does not satisfy the property of subargument structure for K.
Credulous cumulativity in prioritized logic programming
In this section we show that credulous cumulativity is indeed embraced, although implicitly, in prioritized logic programming. We first show that the answer set semantics of extended logic programs without rule preferences satisfies credulous cumulativity. In the two following sections we then show that both well-known and well-studied approaches to preference handling in logic programming, the approach advocated by Delgrande, Schaub, Tompits, Wang and others [15, 44] and the Brewka and Eiter approach [10] , satisfy the credulous cumulativity property.
From now on until the end of this section, we assume a language C consisting of ground atoms α and their classical negation ¬α. An extended logic program is a finite set of logic program rules. The semantics of extended logic programs is defined by their answer sets [22, 23] .
Given a set of lp-rules P and a set X of classical literals. The Gelfond-Lifschitz reduction (or just GL-reduction for short) of P, denoted by P X , is obtained by
• deleting each rule h ← l 1 , . . . , l n , not_l n+1 , . . . , not_l n+k in P such that some l n+ j ∈ X for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and • deleting all naf-literals from the remaining rules.
A non-contradictory set 34 S of classical literals is an answer set of P iff S is the smallest set of literals such that S is closed wrt P S , i.e. for any rule h ← l 1 , . . .l n in P S if l 1 , . . .l n belong to S, then h ∈ S.
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For a logic program P and a finite set of classical literals, define
The following theorem shows that the credulous cumulativity property is satisfied by the answer set semantics of extended logic programming.
Theorem 7.5. Let P be an extended logic program and S be an answer set of P. Further let ⊆ S. Then S is also an answer set of P + .
Proof. Let P = P + . It is not difficult to see that P S = P S + . Therefore S is closed wrt rules in P S . As any set that is closed wrt rules in P S is also closed wrt rules in P S , S is obviously the smallest set that is closed wrt P S . S is hence an answer set of P . P
Delgrande, Schaub, Tompits (DST) -preferred answer sets for prioritized logic programming
Delgrande, Schaub and Tompits [15] view the preferences between rules as constraints on their application orders.
Formally, a prioritized logic program is a pair (P , ≺) where P is an extended logic program and ≺ is a strict partial order on P. 36 Given a set of classical literals X , denote is an answer set S of P such that there is an enumeration (r i ) i≥1 of the rules in P ,S such that for all i, j, we have:
2. if r i ≺ r j then j < i; 3. if r i ≺ r and r ∈ P \ P ,S then (a) bd
For a finite set of classical literals and a prioritized logic program
The following theorem shows that the credulous cumulativity property is satisfied by the DST-answer set semantics of prioritized logic programming.
Theorem 7.6. Let S be a DST-preferred answer set of a prioritized logic program and ⊆ S. Then S is also a DST-preferred answer set of + .
Proof. See Appendix L. P 34 Such sets are referred to as consistent in the literature [15, 10] . We do not use this notion of consistency here to avoid possible misunderstanding with our notion of consistency in Definition 3.5. 35 In earlier papers [22] , the inventors of answer set semantics allow contradictory answer sets. In later papers [30, 32] they suggest to eliminate contradictory answer sets altogether. We follows their suggestion in this paper. 36 A strict partial order is an irreflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation.
Brewka, Eiter (BE) -preferred answer sets for prioritized logic programming
Brewka and Eiter [10] consider a prioritized logic program (P , ≺) as representative of the fully prioritized programs (P , ) such that ≺⊆ and is a strict total order. 37 The preferred answer sets of (P , ≺) are defined as preferred answer sets of (P , ).
A lp-rule r is said to be prerequisite-free iff bd + (r) = ∅. A prerequisite-free program consists only of prerequisite-free rules.
The preferred answer sets of prerequisite-free programs rely on an operator defined below. Definition 7.6. (See [10] .) Let = (P , ) be a prerequisite-free fully prioritized program and (r i ) i≥1 be the enumeration of P according to , 38 and let X be a non-contradictory set of literals. A sequence X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n where n = |P |, 39 is defined by:
(See [10] .) Let = (P , ) be a prerequisite-free fully prioritized program. A set of classical literals S is a BE-preferred answer set of iff S is an answer set of P and C (S) = S. P
In the next step, we recall the definition of BE-preferred answer sets of fully prioritized (possibly not prerequisite-free) logic programs. 2) deleting all prerequisites from the remaining rules. If some rules appear more than once then the repeating copies that appear later in the list are deleted.
For a lp-rule r of the form
Definition 7.9 (BE-preferred answer sets).
(See [10] .) Let P be an extended logic program and S be an answer set of P.
S is a BE-preferred answer set of a fully prioritized logic program
= (P , ) iff S is a BE-preferred answer set of S = (P S , S ), the BE-reduction of wrt S.
2. S is a BE-preferred answer set of prioritized logic program (P , ≺) iff S is a BE-preferred answer set of a fully prioritized logic program (P , ) such that ≺⊆ . P Before proceeding to show that the credulous cumulativity property is satisfied wrt BE-preferred answer set semantics, we present a lemma characterizing the structure of BE-preferred answer sets of prerequisite-free fully prioritized logic programs.
Lemma 7.2. Let = (P , ) be a fully prioritized prerequisite-free logic program and X be an answer set of P . Then X is a BE-preferred answer set of iff for each r ∈ P \ P ,X , if hd(r) /
∈ X then bd − (r) ∩ { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and r r } = ∅ 37 I.e. is a strict partial order such that for every pair of distinct rules r, r , either r r or r r. 38 I.e. r i r j iff j < i. 39 Note that a logic program is a finite set of lp-rules.
Proof. See Appendix L. P 
= (P , ) be a fully prioritized logic program and S be a BE-preferred answer set of and ⊆ S. Then there is strict total order
on P + such that ⊆ and S is also a BE-preferred answer set of (P + , ).
Proof. See Appendix L. P
The following theorem shows that the credulous cumulativity property is satisfied wrt the BE-answer set semantics for prioritized extended logic programs. Theorem 7.7. Let = (P , ≺) be a prioritized logic program and S be a BE-preferred answer set of . Further let ⊆ S. Then S is also a BE-preferred answer set of + .
Proof. Let be a strict total order over P such that ≺ ⊆ and S be a BE-preferred answer set of (P , ). From Lemma 7.3,  there is a total order such that ⊆ and S is a BE-preferred answer set of (P + , ). Therefore ≺ ⊆ . Therefore S is also a BE-preferred answer set of + = (P + , ≺). P
Relationship to ASPIC+
ASPIC+ [35, 34] is an influential and complex approach to structured argumentation incorporating many key concepts from distinct approaches to structured argumentation [38, 40, 7, 15, 10] . The semantics of ASPIC+ is based on the intuitive idea of defining attack relations based on preferences between arguments when a less preferred argument cannot attack a more preferred one as advocated in [3, 6] . A recent work of Hunter and Williams [27] demonstrates the practicality of preference-based abstract argumentation by applying it in aggregating evidence about treatments in medicine.
We first recall below several key definition in ASPIC+ [34, 35] adapted to our framework.
For simplification, a basic knowledge base K = (RS, RD, ∅, BE) is often abbreviated as a triple (RS, RD, BE).
Definition 7.10. An ASPIC+-structured argumentation framework is a pair (K , ) where K is a basic knowledge base and is a binary relation over the set of arguments in AR K . 40 We write A `B iff A B and B A. P Definition 7.11. Given an ASPIC+-structured argumentation framework SA = (K , ), the ASPIC+-attack relation (or just APattack relation for short) att AP (SA) ⊆ AR K × AR K is defined as follows.
(A, B) ∈ att AP (SA) iff one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. A undercuts B.
A rebuts B (at B ) and A `B . P
It is easy to see that the following lemma holds.
Lemma 7.4. Let SA = (K , ) be an ASPIC+-structured argumentation framework. It holds that
att AP (SA) ⊆ att bs (K ), and 2. the ASPIC+-attack relation att AP (K ) satisfies the properties of subargument structure and attack closure. P
Modgil and Prakken apply ASPIC+ to reasoning with rule preferences by presenting four ways to derive argument preferences from the preferences between rules. Based on these derived argument preference relations, four attack relations 41 are derived. We recall them in the following Definitions 7.12, 7.13, 7.14.
Remark 7.1. In [34, 35] , the Definitions 7.12, 7.13, 7.14 are given only for knowledge bases with preorder-preference relations. We adapt them to general knowledge bases directly. Definition 7.12. Let K be a knowledge base and be the preference relation over defeasible rules of K and , be two finite sets of defeasible rules of K and y ∈ {E, D}, 42 define: 40 In [34] , defeasible rules of the form "δ : b 1 , . . . , b n ⇒ ab d " are also allowed. Such rules could be captured in our framework by two rules "δ :
where new δ is a new atom not appearing in any other rule. 41 Called defeats in [35, 34] . 42 We start our analysis of the attack relation assignments att xy , x ∈ {l, w} and y ∈ {E, D}, with a simple and easy lemma.
Lemma 7.5. For each basic knowledge base K , for x ∈ {l, w} and y ∈ {E, D}, att xy (K ) = att bs (K ).
Proof. It follows immediately from Definition 7.12 that for any basic knowledge base, for any two finite sets of defeasible rules , , for y ∈ {E, D}, ¢ y iff = ∅ and = ∅. It holds immediately that if A rebuts B then (A, B) ∈ att x, y (K ) for any x ∈ {l, w} and y ∈ {E, D}. P From Lemma 7.4 , it is easy to see that the following lemma holds. Lemma 7.6. Every attack relation assignment att xy , for x ∈ {l, w} and y ∈ {E, D}, satisfies the properties of context-independence, subargument structure, attack closure and effective rebuts. P It turns out that attack relation assignments based on the elitist ordering att xE , x ∈ {w, l}, satisfy the property of attack monotonicity but not the property of credulous cumulativity, while the situation is reverse for attack relation assignments based on the democratic ordering. 43 Note that for attack relation assignments att, att , att att iff for each knowledge base K, att(K ) ⊆ att (K ).
Proof. See Appendix H. P
The following example shows that both semantics based on the elitist-ordering satisfy neither the consistency postulate nor the credulous cumulativity property in general. a 2 , a 3 , a 4 → ¬a 1 . . . . . . . . . r 4 : a 1 , a 2 , a 3 → ¬a 4 together with four defeasible rules
It is clear that is a preorder and the knowledge base is consistent and closed under transposition. There are in total 8 arguments:
We first show
Similarly, it holds:
Therefore B i does not attack A i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 according to the attack relation att xE (K ) for x = l, w. Therefore att xE (K ) = ∅. All arguments belong to the unique stable (complete) extension whose set of conclusions is S = {a 1 , ¬a 1 44 To see this point, consider arguments containing exactly one occurrence of absurd rules and also as their last rule. Therefore, there are two subarguments containing no absurd rules with conclusions a i , ¬a i for i = 1, .., 4 . Therefore these two subarguments must be A i , B i for some i.
Hence X does not attack any other argument. The unique stable belief set is still the same like before. P There could be more than one way to interpret the elitist and democratic principles leading to different orderings between arguments. One could for example strengthen slightly the elitist principle as in the following example. • A rebuts B (at B ) such that A `l sE B .
• A undercuts B. P Let us consider again the Example 7.1. It is not difficult to see that the following assertions hold: 
It is proved in [39] that strict elitism satisfies the consistency postulate when combined with both the last link and weakest link principles. We leave for future works the questions concerning other properties of the attack relation assignments for both strengthened and strict elitist principles.
The discussion in this chapter shows that ASPIC+ is a fertile framework for studying the semantics of structured argumentation in which a rich and diverse set of argument orderings could be defined. The ordinary properties proposed in this paper could be used for evaluating and classifying the attack relations obtained from these argument orderings.
Discussion and conclusion
We have presented in this paper an axiomatic analysis of semantics for structured argumentation both with and without preferences between defeasible rules by giving a set of simple and intuitive properties that could be used to analyze the attack relations underlying the semantics of structured argumentation. We have shown that the normal attack relation assignment could be viewed as a normal form for ordinary attack relation assignments in the sense that the normal attack relation assignment is ordinary and the stable extensions wrt any ordinary attack relation assignments are also stable extensions wrt the normal attack relation assignment. This insight suggests that one can study the stable semantics of ordinary attack relation assignment by looking at the stable semantics of the normal attack relation assignment.
Many distinct interpretations of preferences between defaults have been proposed and explored intensively in the literature [8, 6, 10, 15, 34, 35] . In this paper, we follow a minimalist approach and embrace a view of the preference between defaults that is shared by the other interpretations. This suggests that the semantics for any more elaborated interpretations of default preferences could be characterized by a subset of the set of stable extensions wrt normal attack relation assignments. Theorem 6.2 suggests that an axiomatic characterization for the new interpretation could be obtained by adding new properties to the axioms of the ordinary semantics presented in this paper.
Gelfond and Son [24] proposed to represent prioritized default reasoning in answer set logic programming. Similarly to our view, Gelfond and Son [24] consider the role of preferences of defaults as a tool for conflict resolution where the knowledge base should specify explicitly which rule is to be picked when two rules are applicable but where accepting both leads to contradiction. Gelfond and Son's approach could be viewed as a kind of "off-the-shelf" programming solution that could be easily implemented in logic programming. Gorogiannis and Hunter, Amgoud and Besnard as well as Hunter and Woltran [25, 2, 1, 28, 45] studied the structure of arguments and their semantics based on classical or abstract Tarski logics. The relationship between these approaches and the ASPIC+ framework has also been studied in [34] . Garcia and Simari's defeasible logic programming [21] studied attacks based on the specificity principle while Bondarenko, Dung, Kowalski and Toni [7] considered assumption-based attacks.
An interesting challenge is to study the possibilities to integrate our approach with these approaches. A combination of our approach with Gelfond and Son's one could provide a methodology for developing prioritized default reasoning where guidelines for the conflict relations should be provided to capture the normal semantics. Such combinations would be both ordinary and suitable for quick deployment in applications. Some interesting results have been presented in Lemma 7.4 showing that the ASPIC+-attack relations already embody in them self key features of ordinary semantics. The results in section 7.4 suggests that there is much in common between ASPIC+ semantics and the ordinary semantics. Though the formal interpretation of the elitist and democratic principles in [34, 35] are appealing, a deeper analysis of these principles may be helpful to an integrated framework for structured argumentation.
In this paper, we focus our attention on stable semantics. We believe many of the results in this paper also hold for other semantics like complete extension semantics. For example, the credulous cumulativity property should hold wrt complete extension semantics for the same reasons it holds wrt stable semantics. We show below that it is indeed the case. We first adapt the definition of credulous cumulativity property for complete extension semantics.
Definition 8.1 (Credulous cumulativity wrt complete extensions).
Let K be a sensible class of knowledge bases. An attack relation assignment att is said to satisfy the property of credulous cumulativity for K wrt complete extension semantics if and only if for each K ∈ K, for each complete belief set S of K wrt att and for each finite subset ⊆ S of literals, 1. K + belongs to K and 2. S is a complete belief set of K + wrt att. P An identical proof of Lemma 4.1 where references to stable extensions are simply replaced by complete extensions shows that credulous cumulativity implies both the consistency and closure postulates for complete extensions.
The following theorem shows that the credulous cumulativity property wrt complete extension semantics is also satisfied by the normal attack relation assignment. 
Proof. See Appendix J. P
We conclude this section with a discussion of the relationship between our notion of credulous cumulativity and Gabbay's "skeptical" version of cumulativity [20] . Skeptical cumulativity has been studied extensively by Kraus, Lehman and Magidor [29] , Brewka [9] , Geffner and Pearl [26] , Dung and Son [18] . Skeptical cumulativity intuitively states that adding a skeptical conclusion to the knowledge base does not change the other conclusions. Brewka [9] generalized and adapted the idea of skeptical cumulativity to default logic. We adopt Brewka's concept as the semantics of both default logic and our knowledge bases are based on the notion of extensions.
A stable belief set could be viewed as representing a possible world given a background knowledge base K . In this spirit, we could say that a set of domain literals is predictable wrt K iff is a subset of some stable belief set of K .
An expansion K + of K by a predictable is then said to be a predictable expansion of K . Skeptical cumulativity could be viewed as stating that the stable belief sets of predictable expansions of a knowledge base K coincide with the stable belief sets of K. This intuition is formalized in the following definition adapted from Brewka's formulation of skeptical cumulativity for default logics [9] . Definition 8.2. We say that an attack relation assignment att satisfies the skeptical cumulativity property for a sensible class of knowledge bases K iff 1. all predictable expansions of knowledge bases in K belong to K, and 2. for each predictable expansion K + of K ∈ K, the set of stable belief sets of K + coincides with the set of stable belief set S of K where ⊆ S. P It is obvious that skeptical cumulativity implies credulous cumulativity. But the reverse does not hold as the example below shows. Example 8.1. Consider a basic knowledge base K = (RS, RD, , BE) where RS = ∅, = ∅, BE = ∅ and RD consists of three defeasible rules
It is clear that S = {a, b} is a stable belief set of K wrt attack relation att bs (K ). It is also clear that S is a stable belief set of K = K + {b}. But K has another stable belief set {¬a, b} (wrt att bs (K )) that is not a stable belief set of K . Therefore the skeptical cumulativity property does not hold for the basic attack relation assignment att bs . P From the induction hypothesis, there is an argument T whose premises are in Prem( A n ) ∪ {¬α n } and whose conclusion is ¬α.
Let T be the argument obtained from T by replacing each occurrence of premise ¬α n by the argument B. It is clear that Prem(T ) ⊆ Prem( A) ∪ {¬σ } and Cnl(T ) = ¬α. P Proof. Let X be a minimal inconsistent set of domain literals. Since X is inconsistent, there is a domain literal λ such that X K λ and X K ¬λ.
• Let K be closed under contraposition. Let x ∈ X . It is clear {x, λ} K λ. Since K is closed under contraposition, it follows obviously {λ, ¬λ} K ¬x. Therefore X K ¬x. • Let K be closed under transposition. There are two arguments A 0 , A 1 with premises in X and conclusions λ, ¬λ respectively. From the minimality of X, it holds: Then RS is closed under contraposition.
Proof. Let S be a set of literals and S λ and σ ∈ S. We show S \ {σ } ∪ {¬λ} ¬σ . There are two cases:
If σ = λ then we are done. Suppose σ = λ. Then {λ, ¬λ} ⊆ S \ {σ } ∪ {¬λ}. We are done.
(b) λ / ∈ S. Because S is consistent and λ / ∈ S, λ must be derived from S using a rule of the form a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n → ¬a i . Without loss of generality, we could assume λ = ¬a 1 . Therefore S = {a 2 , . . . , a n }. We are done.
S is inconsistent.
(a) There is i: {a i , ¬a i } ⊆ S.
• σ ∈ {a i , ¬a i }.
Obviously ¬σ ∈ S \ {σ } ∪ {¬λ}. We are done.
• σ / ∈ {a i , ¬a i }. Obviously {a i , ¬a i } ⊆ S \ {σ } ∪ {¬λ}. We are done as absurd rules derive any thing. (b) There is no i:
Since S is inconsistent, there is i such that there are strict arguments over S supporting a i , ¬a i without using absurd rules. The only such arguments are [a i ] and a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n → ¬a i . Therefore S = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n }.
• λ = a i .
If σ = a i , obviously {a i , ¬a i } ⊆ S \ {σ } ∪ {¬λ}. We are done. Suppose σ = a i , we are also done obviously.
• λ = ¬a i . 
Proof.
We prove by induction on the structure of A.
• "Only IF". There are two cases:
Hence X = X . The lemma holds obviously for A = A.
We are done. Suppose X = X . Hence X is a subargument of some X i , say X 1 . From induction hypothesis, there is some subargument A 1 of A 1 such that X ∈ A 1 ↑ . Set A = A 1 , we are done. 1. We show that the stable belief sets of K, K' coincide.
(a) Let E be a stable extension of K and S = cnl(E). Due to the context-independence, E is conflict-free wrt att(K ).
We show that S is a stable belief set of K .
Let E = {X ∈ AR K s.t. st( X) ∈ E and E ∪ {X} is conflict-free wrt att(K')}. It is obvious that E ⊆ E and S = cnl(E ). We show that E is stable extension of (AR K , att(K )).
We first show E is conflict-free wrt att(K'). Suppose there are X, Y ∈ E s.t. X attacks Y wrt att(K ). From the attack monotonicity, st( X) attacks Y wrt att(K') implying that E attacks Y wrt att(K ). Contradiction since E ∪ {Y } is conflict-free wrt att(K ). We show that E attacks each argument in AR K not belonging to it. Let X ∈ AR K \ E . From the definition of E , it follows immediately that st( X) / ∈ E or E ∪ {X} is not conflict-free wrt att(K'). If st( X) / ∈ E then there is A ∈ E s.t. A attacks st(X) wrt att(K). Due to the context independence, A attacks st(X) wrt att(K'). Due to attack monotonicity, A attacks X wrt att(K'). Hence E' attacks X wrt att(K').
Suppose now st( X) ∈ E and E ∪ {X} is not conflict-free wrt att(K'). If X does not attack E wrt att(K ) then E attacks X wrt att(K ) since E ∪ {X} is not conflict-free wrt att(K'). We are done.
Suppose X attacks E wrt att(K'). Therefore st(X) attacks E wrt att(K'). Thus st(X) attacks E wrt att(K) due to the context-independence. Contradiction to the fact that st( X) ∈ E and E is conflict-free. This case hence does not occur. (b) Let E' be a stable extension of (AR K , att(K )). Therefore st(E ) ⊆ E (otherwise E attacks st(E ) wrt att(K'). Due to attack-monotonicity, E attacks itself wrt att(K'), a contradiction). Let E = st(E ). E is hence conflict-free wrt att(K').
Due to the context-independence, E is hence conflict-free wrt att(K).
Let X ∈ AR K \ E. We show that E attacks X wrt att(K). From st( X) = X , it follows X / ∈ E . Therefore E attacks X wrt att(K'). From attack monotonicity and E = st(E ), E attacks X wrt att(K'). From the context-independence, E attacks X wrt att(K). E hence attacks every argument in AR K not belonging to E wrt att(K). E is stable wrt att(K). 2. We show that the complete belief sets of K, K' (wrt att) coincide.
(a) Let E be a complete extension of (AR K , att(K )). Due to the context-independence, E is conflict-free wrt att(K ).
Property 1. For each A ∈ AR K , A is defended by E wrt att(K) iff A is defended by E wrt att(K').
Proof. "⇐" Let A be defended by E (wrt att(K )). Let X ∈ AR K attack A wrt att(K ). Due to the context-independence, X also attacks A wrt att(K ). Therefore E attacks X wrt att(K ). Due to the context independence, E attacks X wrt att(K ). We proved that A is defended by E wrt att(K). "⇒" Let A be defended by E (wrt att(K )). Let X ∈ AR K attack A wrt att(K ). Due to the attack monotonicity, st( X) also attacks A wrt att(K ). Due to the context independence, st( X) also attacks A wrt att(K). Hence E attacks st(X) wrt att(K). Due to the context independence, E attacks st(X) wrt att(K ). Therefore E attacks X wrt att(K ) (due to attack monotonicity). We proved that A is defended by E wrt att(K'). P
Property 2. Let A ∈ AR K such that A is defended by E wrt att(K'). Then st(A) is defended by E wrt att(K').
Proof. Let X ∈ AR K attack st(A) wrt att(K'). Due to the attack monotonicity, st( X) also attacks st(A) wrt att(K ).
Hence st(X) attacks A wrt att(K') due to the attack monotonicity. Therefore E attacks st(X) wrt att(K'). Due to attack monotonicity, E attacks X wrt att(K'). P It follows immediately from Properties 1, 2: For each A ∈ AR K , if A is defended by E wrt att(K') then st(A) is defended by E wrt att(K) implying that st( A) ∈ E. Let E = E ∪ {A ∈ AR K s.t. A is defended by E wrt att(K')}. From Property 1, each argument in E is defended by E wrt att(K'). It is also clear
Since Y is defended by E wrt att(K'), E attacks X wrt att(K'). Since X is also defended by E wrt att(K'), E attacks E wrt att(K'). From contextindependence, E attacks E wrt att(K). Contradiction.
From st(E ) ⊆ E and the attack monotonicity, it follows immediately that any argument in AR K attacked by E wrt att(K ) is also attacked by E wrt att(K ). Hence any argument in AR K defended by E wrt att(K ) is also defended by E wrt att(K ) and hence belongs to E . E is a complete extension of (AR K 
We show that E is a complete extension of (AR K , att(K )). Due to the context independence and E ⊆ E , it is clear that E is conflict-free. Let A ∈ AR K be defended by E wrt att(K).
We first show A is defended by E wrt att(K').
Let X ∈ AR K attack A wrt att(K'). Therefore st(X) attacks A wrt att(K') due to the attack monotonicity. Due to the context-independence, st(X) attacks A wrt att(K). Since A is defended by E wrt att(K), st(X) is attacked by E wrt att(K). From E = st(E ), st(X) is attacked by st(E ) wrt att(K). From the context-independence, st(X) is attacked by st(E ) wrt att(K'). From st(E ) ⊆ E , E attacks st(X) wt att(K'). From attack monotonicity, E' attacks X wrt att(K'). Since E is complete, A ∈ E . Hence A ∈ E. We proved that E is complete. P . Therefore there exists X ∈ SU such that no proper subarguments of X belong to SU. Hence all proper subarguments of X belong to E. From X / ∈ E, and E is a stable extension, E attacks X wrt att(K). Let A ∈ E such that (A, X) ∈ att(K ). Since X is a subargument of B, and B is not undercut by any argument in E, X is not undercut by any argument in E. Hence X is not undercut by A.
We first prove that X is basic defeasible. Suppose the contrary. Therefore X = [X 1 , . . . , X n , r] and r is a strict rule. Since all proper subarguments of X belong to E, ∀i :
and r is a strict rule and for every i, X i and all subarguments of X i belong to E, A contradicts X (at X ) (Definition 4.10). Hence cnl(E) is contradictory. Contradiction. We have proved that X is basic defeasible.
Because (A, X) ∈ att(K ), all proper subarguments of X belong to E and A does not undercut X, it is clear that A directly rebuts X . P Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we introduce a helpful notation and prove a lemma. The main proof is given in the second step. 
following the property of attack monotonicity.
From cnl(D) = cnl( A) and the fact that all proper arguments of X belong to E and the conflict-freeness and consistency of E and the property of attack closure, it is clear that D does not attack any proper subargument of X. Proof. We prove by induction on the structure of A.
Since X is not a subargument of any argument in AS,
Suppose X = X . Hence X is a subargument of some X i , say X 1 . From induction hypothesis, there is some subargument 
Proof. Let E be a complete extension of (AR K , att nr (K )) and S = cnl(E). From Lemma F.3, it is obvious that S is closed.
We next show the consistency of S. Suppose the contrary. Since S is closed, S is contradictory. Thus there are two 
We show that E is a stable extension of (AR K , att nr (K )).
From Lemma F.4, it follows S is consistent. S is hence not contradictory.
As E is conflict-free wrt att nr (K ), E is also free from the undercut-attacks. From Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3, it follows that E contains all subarguments of its arguments. Since S = cnl(E ) is not contradictory and E contains all subarguments of its arguments, E is free from rebuts. Therefore E is conflict-free wrt att nr (K ).
Property. Let Proof. Since E contains all subarguments of its arguments, we only need to prove the "if"-direction.
Suppose ∀i :
It is clear that there exists a subargument X of Z such that all proper subarguments of X belong to E and X / ∈ E . From S = cnl(E) = cnl(E ) and BE ∪ ⊆ S and the above property, it follows X = [X 1 , . . . , X n , d] and d is defeasible and ∀i :
We show that E' attacks X wrt att nr (K ).
There are two cases:
Hence E attacks X wrt att nr (K ). From Lemma 6.4 , att nr satisfies the context-independence property. Hence E attacks X wrt att nr (K ).
be a minimal subset of such that X ∈ AR K + . Further let AS be a minimal subset of E such that cnl(AS) = .
Let Y be obtained from X by replacing each subargument [α] , α ∈ , of X by an argument A α ∈ AS where cnl( A α ) = α.
• E undercuts Y i . Since E does not undercut any argument in AS, E undercuts X i . From X i ∈ E , E undercuts itself. Impossible. This case hence does not happen.
•
From AS ⊆ E and E contains all subarguments of its arguments, it follows that Y i is not a subargument of any argument in AS. From Y i ∈ X i ↓ AS and Lemma F.1, it follows that there exists a subargument X i of X i s.t. Y i ∈ X i ↓ AS. Therefore E contradicts X i at X i . From X i ∈ E and E contains all subarguments of its arguments, it follows that X i ∈ E . Thus E is contradictory. Contradiction to the consistency of cnl(E ) (Note that cnl(E ) = cnl(E)). From AS ⊆ E and C ∈ E, it follows that C does not attack AS wrt att nr (K ). From the context-independence property, C does not attack AS wrt att nr (K ). Since Y is a weakening of X wrt AS and att nr satisfies the axiom of link-orientation (Lemma 6.4), (C, X) ∈ att nr (K ). From 
There are two cases: We show that (d i ) i≥1 is an enumeration of E as defined in Definition 7.1.
It is obvious that if
There exists hence a basic defeasible argument B with last(B) = d and whose proper subarguments all belong to E. 
We show that E is a stable extension of (AR K , att xD (K )).
From Lemma H.1 below, it follows S is consistent. S is hence not contradictory.
As E is conflict-free wrt att xD (K ), E is also free from the undercut-attacks. From Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3, it follows that E contains all subarguments of its arguments. Since S = cnl(E ) is not contradictory and E contains all subarguments of its arguments, E is free from rebuts. Therefore E is conflict-free wrt att xD (K ). Proof. Since E contains all subarguments of its arguments, we only need to prove the "if"-direction.
Suppose ∀i : • E undercuts B. Since E does not undercut any argument in AS, E undercuts A. From A ∈ E , E undercuts itself. Contradiction. This case hence does not happen.
• E rebuts B at B . Therefore B / ∈ E. From AS ⊆ E and E contains all subarguments of its arguments, it follows that B is not a subargument of any argument in AS. From B ∈ A ↓ AS and Lemma F.1, it follows that there exists a subargument A of A s.t. B ∈ A ↓ AS. Therefore E contradicts A at A . From A ∈ E and E contains all subarguments of its arguments, it follows that A ∈ E . Thus E is contradictory. Contradiction to the consistency of cnl(E ) (note that cnl(E ) = cnl(E)). P Let Z ∈ AR K + \ E . We show that E attacks Z wrt att lD (K ). It is clear that there exists a subargument X of Z such that all proper subarguments of X belong to E and X / ∈ E . From S = cnl(E) = cnl(E ) and BE ∪ ⊆ S and the above Property 1, it follows X = [X 1 , . . . , X n , d] and d is defeasible and ∀i :
We show that E' attacks X wrt att xD (K ).
There are two cases: Therefore from the above Property 2, it holds that ∀i :
• C undercuts Y. Since AS ⊆ E, it follows C undercuts X. Therefore E attacks X wrt att xD .
and Y i ∈ E, it follows that C rebuts Y at Y. Therefore C also rebuts X at X. 
Proof. Let S = cnl(E). From Lemma H.4, it is obvious that S is closed.
We next show the consistency of S. Suppose the contrary. Since S is closed, S is contradictory. Thus there are two arguments A, B ∈ E such that cnl(B) = ¬cnl(A). Let Proof. Let K ∈ K, E be a stable extension of (AR K , att(K )), S = cnl(E) and r be a rule not applicable wrt S. Let K = K + r.
We show that E is also a stable extension of K .
From the property of context-independence, E is conflict-free wrt att(K ). We only need to show that E attacks (wrt att(K )) each argument in AR K not belonging to E.
Let A be an argument in AR K not belonging to E. If A is also an argument in AR K then E attacks A wrt att(K ) and hence also wrt att(K ) (due to the property of context-independence).
Suppose that A is not an argument in AR K . Hence r appears in A. As r is not applicable in S, there is a subargument B of A without containing r and whose conclusion does not belong to S. Hence E attacks B wrt att(K ) (and therefore also wrt att(K ) due to the property of context-independence). B is hence defeasible. Therefore from the property of subargument structure, E attacks A (wrt att(K )). E is hence a stable extension of K . P Lemma I.1. Let K be a sensible class of knowledge bases and att be an attack relation assignment satisfying the properties of subargument structure and attack closure for K. Further let K ∈ K and E be a stable extension of (AR K , att(K )) such that cnl(E) is consistent.
Then cnl(E) is generated by the set of rules appearing in arguments in E.
Proof. Let be the set of rules appearing in E. We show that S = cnl(E) is generated by .
1. It is obvious that for each literal σ , σ ∈ S iff there is an argument A such that cnl( A) = σ and all rules appearing in A belong to .
2. To show that for each rule γ ∈ RS ∪ RD, γ ∈ iff (γ is strict and bd(γ ) ⊆ S and hd(γ ) ∈ S) or (γ is defeasible and bd(γ ) ⊆ S and hd(γ ) ∈ S and ab γ / ∈ S), we only need to show the "if"-direction.
Suppose γ / ∈ . Let bd(γ ) = {α 1 , . . . , α n }. rebut at B (if X undercuts B, E would also undercut B, a contradiction) .
From X ∈ E , it follows there is X ∈ E s.t. X ∈ X ↑ . Hence from Lemma J.3, there is AS 0 ⊆ E s.t. X ∈ X ↓ AS 0 . From X ∈ E, X does not attack B wrt att nr (K ). We hence have (X , B) ∈ att nr (K ), (X, B) / ∈ att nr (K ) and X is a weakening of X by AS 0 ⊆ E. From Lemma J.1, it follows that E attacks X or B wrt att nr (K ). Since X ∈ E, E attacks B wrt att nr (K ). Due to the context-independence of att nr , E attacks B wrt att nr (K ). Contradiction. P hypothesis, it is easy to see X j = {hd(r j )} ∪ X j−1 = {hd(r j )} ∪ { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and (r j−1 r or r = r j−1 ) } = { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and (r j r or r = r j ) }.
We show that bd − (r) ∩ { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and r r } = ∅. Since hd(r i ) / ∈ X , it follows bd − (r i ) ∩ X i−1 = ∅. Since X is BE-preferred, X i ⊆ X . Therefore r i / ∈ P ,X . From X i = { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and (r i r or r = r i ) } and r i / ∈ P ,X , it follows X i = { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and r i r } = { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and r r }. From X i = X i−1 and bd − (r i ) ∩ X i−1 = ∅, it follows bd − (r) ∩ { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and r r } = ∅.
1. "If-Part".
Suppose for each r ∈ P \ P ,X , if hd(r) / ∈ X then bd − (r) ∩ { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and r r } = ∅. Further let P i = {r 1 , . . . , r i },
We first show by induction that for each i, X i = { hd(r) | r ∈ P i ∩ P ,X } ⊆ X
• Base step: i = 0. Obvious.
• Inductive step. Suppose X i−1 = { hd(r) | r ∈ P i−1 ∩ P ,X } ⊆ X . We show X i = { hd(r) | r ∈ P i ∩ P ,X } ⊆ X .
Therefore bd − (r i ) ∩ X i−1 = ∅ or hd(r i ) ∈ X and bd − (r i ) ∩ X = ∅. From X i−1 ⊆ X , it follows that bd − (r i ) ∩ X = ∅.
Hence r i / ∈ P ,X . Therefore P i−1 ∩ P ,X = P i ∩ P ,X . From induction hypothesis, we can state: X i = X i−1 = { hd(r) | r ∈ P i−1 ∩ P ,X } = { hd(r) | r ∈ P i ∩ P ,X } ⊆ X . There are two cases: * hd(r i ) / ∈ X . Since X is an answer set of P, it follows that the head of each rule in P ,X belongs to X. Therefore r i / ∈ P ,X .
Therefore, bd − (r i ) ∩ { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and r i r } = ∅. Since r 1 , . . . , r n is an enumeration of P according to , it holds: {r ∈ P ,X | r i r } = P i−1 ∩ P ,X . Therefore from the inductive hypothesis: { hd(r ) | r ∈ P ,X and X i = {hd(r i )} ∪ X i−1 = {hd(r i )} ∪ { hd(r) | r ∈ P i−1 ∩ P ,X } = { hd(r) | r ∈ P i ∩ P ,X } ⊆ X . From X n = { hd(r) | r ∈ P n ∩ P ,X } = { hd(r) | r ∈ P ,X } = X , it follows that X is a BE-preferred answer set of (P , ). P Lemma 7.3. Let = (P , ) be a fully prioritized logic program and S be a BE-preferred answer set of and ⊆ S. Then there is strict total order on P + such that ⊆ and S is also a BE-preferred answer set of (P + , ).
Proof. From Theorem 7.5, S is also an answer set of Q = P + . For each ω ∈ , let C ω denote the clause ω ←. Let be a strict total order on P + such that ⊆ and for each ω ∈ , each C ∈ P , it holds that C ω C if C ω = C .
From Lemma 7.2, it holds:
• S is a BE-preferred answer set of (P , ) iff S is a BE-preferred answer set of (P S , S ) iff for each r ∈ P S \ P S ,S , if hd(r) / ∈ S then bd − (r) ∩ { hd(r ) | r ∈ P S ,S and r S r } = ∅
• S is a BE-preferred answer set of (Q , ) iff S is a BE-preferred answer set of (Q For ease of reference, we recall the attack relation assignment att defined for K below: For each K ∈ K:
As K ∈ K, it follows from the elaboration in Example 5.1 that att does not satisfy the property of subargument structure for K.
